Thank you, etc. I'm very sympathetic to the arguments we've seen here, but I'll put on my logical pluralist hat and offer some comments.

First, the Discipline Pluralism argument. This argument seems to go that logic is the study of validity, but sentential logic and propositional logic aren't about different validities, and so at least this way to logical pluralism doesn't work. That is, if sentential logic and propositional logic are, as the pluralist would have it, different sub-disciplines of logic, then they must be about interestingly different properties of inquiry, but these logics aren't about interestingly different properties of inquiry.

I'd like to hear more about what exactly the relevant objects and properties of inquiry are here, since these details seem, to me, to matter for how this argument works. Normally, we say that validity is a property of arguments. On this picture, then, it would seem like validity is the property of inquiry for logic, and arguments are the objects of inquiry. And this sounds plausible.

But if arguments are the objects of inquiry, then it would seem like we do have two different sub-disciplines. Sentences and propositions are different kinds of things, and aren't like different breeds of dog. If so, then we might expect arguments made up entirely of sentences and arguments made up entirely of propositions to likewise be different in some important respects. Logic studies arguments, but one sub-discipline of logic studies one kind of argument, those made up entirely of sentences, and one sub-discipline studies another kind of argument, those made up entirely of propositions. This seems to be a sort of pluralism.

But we could focus on validity instead. There is some sort of validity property, call it sentential validity, that only arguments made up entirely of sentences can instantiate. Likewise, there is another sort of validity property, call it propositional validity, that only arguments made up entirely of propositions

can instantiate. But so long as both properties are still interesting, and it seems interesting about them that they can only be instantiated by one sort of argument, it seems like we can get different sub-disciplines of logic. So, we have a sort of pluralism, again.

A further comment on the Discipline Pluralism argument, specifically about the claim that when we talk about pluralism about x, we mean the view that there is no one correct view about x. Surely, though, we could be pluralists about *what the correct object of inquiry is*. If we think the object of inquiry of logic is good arguments, we can be a pluralist about what constitutes a good argument: there are good sentential arguments and good propositional arguments, and they may not have certain uniting features that we could appeal to instead. Likewise for validity. We can think there is no one true validity uniting good arguments overall, but only different, though equally correct, validities per sort of argument.

Second, the System Pluralism argument. This argument seems to go that logic is a formal system that captures the notion of validity. But sentential logic and propositional logic don't generate different formal systems in a way that gives us a substantive pluralism, since the translation procedure isn't part of the logical system itself.

I'll grant that this is right in this particular case, but surely we can be a pluralist about logical systems. Classical logic, intuitionist logic, relevant logic, LP, FDE, and so on are all different logical systems (or, all result in different logical systems). They say different rules of inference are good, different arguments are valid, different truth tables for the logical connectives are correct, and so on. To be a pluralist here, then, would be to say that these formal systems are equally correct ways of capturing some notion or other of validity. And the issue about the translation procedure doesn't seem to apply, since these systems are already substantively different in other ways. (And, also, recall some of what

I said earlier about the idea that there could be different, but equally correct, notions of validity.) Further, in my experience with arguments about logical pluralism, this seems to be the sort of pluralism most mean. Even if the System Pluralism argument we've seen here shows that sentential logic and propositional logic don't get us to pluralism, it seems we can get to pluralism this way instead.

Third, the Application Pluralism argument. This argument seems to go that pluralism in this sense is consistent with logical monism as it's usually understood, especially since it's just a virtue of a logical system if it has more applications. Having different applications isn't sufficient for logical pluralism.

I'll grant that this argument succeeds for the specific case of sentential logic and propositional logic, but I'm not quite sure that the argument here tells against pluralism in general, and so I'd like to hear more about this line of thought. What I'd expect a pluralist to need to succeed here is two distinct logical systems, each of which applies to its own domain, but which don't apply to each other's domain. That is, each has to be able to do something the other can't. (Maybe some sort of liner logic and some sort of fuzzy logic would do the trick, here; I'm not quite sure about those details.) Then, at least barring any strong third alternative that can do what each of the other two can do, we'd seem to have an application-based logical pluralism that surely isn't compatible with logical monism.

I'll take my pluralist hat off now. Thank you.